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I. INTRODUCTION
In Braesch v. Union Insurance Co.1 the Nebraska Supreme Court
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769 (1991). "First party coverage refers to types of insur-
ance coverage under which the insurer contracts to pay benefits directly to the
insured, as distinguished from liability or third-party coverage under which the
BAD FAITH REFUSAL TO SETTLE
first recognized the tort of bad faith denial of first party insurance
claims. Nebraska was the thirty-sixth jurisdiction to recognize a cause
of action for bad faith in first-party cases. 2
This Note begins with an overview of the development of the law
of bad faith in insurance. It discusses the earlier adoption of the bad
faith tort action in situations where liability insurers breached-their
duty to settle claims in good faith. It further discusses why other
courts transferred the third party insurer's obligation to deal in good
faith to first party insurers.
Second, the Note outlines the facts and holding of the case. Third,
it analyzes the court's rationale for imposing the duty of good faith
and fair dealing upon insurers and for allowing mental distress dam-
ages for bad faith breach of first party insurance contracts. Fourth, it
discusses the implications of that rationale for bad faith breach outside
the insurance setting.
Finally, the Note examines the types of conduct that will expose an
insurer to extracontractual tort damages in first party claims and cau-
tions potential defendants that when a first party bad faith plaintiff
successfully pleads a tort cause of action, certain defenses will not be
available. The Note also incorporates the two subsequent Nebraska
decisions which have applied the standard set forth in Braesch.3
insurer contracts to indemnify the insured against liability to third parties." WIL-
ULAm M. SHERNOFF, ET AL., INsuRANcE BAD FArrH LITIGATION § 5.01, at 5-3 n.4
(1991).
2. For jurisdictions that recognized the cause of action before Nebraska, see Morgan
v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 559 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Va. 1983)(applying Vir-
ginia law); Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Iowa
1982)(applying Iowa law). Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916
(Ala. 1981); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska
1989); Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973); Rederscheid v. Compre-
care, Inc., 667 P.2d 766 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Grand Sheet Metal Products Co. v.
Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Davis v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 314 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730
P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986); Sexton v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 337 N.E.2d 527 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977); Payne v.
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 313 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Corwin
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979);
Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 1983); Christian v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616
(S.C. 1983); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
1987); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
3. Subsequent to the Braesch decision the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a suf-
ficient cause of action for bad faith had been stated when the plaintiff alleged that
the insurer had denied fire insurance coverage based on suspected arson without
conducting a proper investigation and subjecting the results to a reasonable eval-
uation and review. Ruwe v. Farmers Mut. United Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 67, 469
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A. From Third Party Claims to First Party Claims
The cause of action for bad faith breach of an insurance contract
originated in third party insurance claims.4 Under a typical liability
insurance policy, the insurer has the duties of indemnifying and de-
fending the insured, and is given exclusive control over the defense
and settlement of claims brought by third parties.5
In conducting the defense and settlement of third party claims, an
insurer owes its insured a duty of good faith and a duty to use the care
of a reasonably prudent liability insurer.6 Nonetheless, there is an in-
herent conflict of interest in settling claims which simultaneously af-
fects the rights of both the insurer and the insured, creating the
potential for an insurer to abuse the discretion entrusted by its in-
sured. Thus, courts have imposed extracontractual consequential
damages upon insurers that breach their duty of good faith.
The conflict of interest involved in settling claims is clearest in sit-
uations where a third party claimant makes a settlement offer at or
near the policy limits. In this scenario, the insurer has very little up-
ward risk. Under traditional contract principles, if an insurer
breached its duty to pay claims, courts only awarded the amount due
under the policy, plus legal interest.7 Thus, applying traditional con-
N.W.2d 129 (1991). See also Bailey v. Farmers Union Co-operative Ins. Co., No. A-
91-1158, 1992 Neb. App. LEXIS 327 (Dec. 22, 1992). In Bailey the Plaintiff was
awarded $150,000 in mental distress damages on a $52,000 property insurance pol-
icy. The insurer had represented to the insured that her claim was "questiona-
ble" six weeks after the insurer's adjuster had determined that the "loss was
covered." Id- at *10-11. The insurer subsequently refused to pay the "replace-
ment costs" of it's insured's house in spite of clear language in the policy and no
reasonable basis for denying the claim. Id at *13. See infra note 67.
4. "Because the first cases applying the tort of bad faith all involved the insurer's
handling of third party claims against its insured, there was some doubt for
awhile whether this new tort would be applicable to an insurer's unreasonable
refusal to pay a claim by its own insured.... SHERNOFF, ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 1.07(2) at 1-25. See, e.g., Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198,
200 (Cal. 1958)(liability insurer must give equal consideration to insured's inter-
ests); Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852 (Fla. 1938)(implied duty al-
lows consequential damages in amount of excess judgment); Hilker v. Western
Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 259 (Wis. 1930) aff'd on reh'g 235 N.W. 413
(1931)(control over settlement negotiations creates agency relationship).
5. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. Wmiss, INsuRANcE LAW, § 9.1(a), 9.1(b), at 988-90
(1988). See also, Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136, 1137 (1954); SHERNOFF, ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 3.01 at 3-3.
6. See, e.g., Alsobrook v. National Travelers Life Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 768 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1993); Bartlett v. American Republic Ins. Co., 845 S.W. 2d 342 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992).
7. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378 (1872)(insurance contract is agree-
ment to pay money, plus interest when overdue); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 43 A. 503 (Me. 1899)(insurer not liable for damage verdict
exceeding policy limit by $1,000); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 140 N.E.
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tract rules resulted in great potential for abuse.
Under traditional contract rules, insurers faced with settlement of-
fers at or near the policy limits have everything to gain and very little
to lose.8 There is considerable potential for an insurer to save money
on the policy by forcing litigation. By litigating, an insurer may pres-
sure a claimant to settle for less or may even avoid liability altogether.
At the same time, the insurer who fails to conduct the settlement in
good faith exposes her insured to great risks of liability in excess of
policy coverage.
Early third party decisions recognized that insurers concurrently
defended their own interests and the interests of their insured, a con-
flict that makes traditional contract remedies inadequate for compen-
sating the victims of bad faith conduct and for deterring such conduct.9
By applying the traditional contractual duty of good faith to third
party insurance claims and recharacterizing the claim as a tort action,
courts were able to counter this conflict of interest. Early third party
bad faith actions awarded damages in excess of the policy limits when
insurers breached their duty to defend and settle claims in good
faith.0 The consequential damages which accompanied this cause of
action provided insurers with a powerful incentive to settle claims in
good faith.
California's courts first recognized that the third party insurers'
good faith obligation was not one peculiar to liability insurers in
Gruenburg v. Aetna Insurance Co.31 Gruenberg differed from earlier
third party decisions in that the insured was seeking to recover for his
own losses rather than seeking indemnity for liability to a third party.
This type of claim is called a first party claim.
In Gruenberg, the insured was denied payment under a fire insur-
ance policy after his business burned.12 Following the fire, the insur-
577, 579 (N.Y. 1923)(liability insurer had not breached any duty by refusing to
settle). These cases apply to insurance contracts the rule of the landmark case
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1954)(no damages beyond the price of
the bargained for object of contract).
8. "The insurer... stands to save the value of the policy by successfully litigating
the claim, while liability is contractually limited in the event that the third party
prevails. Thus, the insurer stands to gain by refusing a settlement offer at or near
the policy limits and instead taking the risk of litigation." SHERNOFF, ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 3.01 at 3-4.
9. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Communale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958)(insurer liable for any excess judgment).
10. "The policy limits restrict only the amount the insurer may have to pay in the
performance of the contract as compensation to a third person for personal inju-
ries caused by the insured; they do not restrict the damages recoverable by the
insured for a breach of contract by the insurer." Communale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
11. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
12. Id. at 1034.
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ance adjuster implied to the arson investigator that the insured had
criminal motives. Thereafter, the insurer denied coverage because the
insured would not submit to an examination during the pendency of
the criminal charges. The Gruenburg court held the insurer liable in
tort for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing-
[Iln the case before us we consider the duty of an insurer to act in good faith
and fairly in handling the claim of an insured, namely a duty not to withhold
unreasonably payment due under a policy.... That responsibility is not the
requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or
pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the
insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual
responsibilities.1 3
Thirty-four jurisdictions eventually followed California's lead.14
In January 1991, the Nebraska Supreme Court joined these juris-
dictions and recognized the bad faith cause of action in a first party
claim in Braesch.
B. Facts and Issues
The Braesch decision involved an uninsured motorist policy which
was issued to Duane E. Braesch and Helen E. Braesch, husband and
wife, by Union Insurance Company. The policy provided $100,000 cov-
erage for bodily injury "which the insured or covered person was le-
gally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle." 15
The Braesches alleged that their daughter, Lori J. Braesch, was
killed in an accident by a negligent uninsured motorist while she was
driving a vehicle covered under the policy. The Braesches further al-
leged that Union denied payment of the claim without adequately in-
vestigating it or developing any defense. After three years and
repeated efforts by the Braesches to settle, the decedent's administra-
tor sued the insurer and won a judgement for $185,000.16 The surviv-
ing parents then sued the insurer.
In this action, the Braesches sought general damages based upon 1)
the tort of bad faith and 2) the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Under the first theory of relief, the Braesches alleged:
[D]espite repeated efforts by the Braesches and their counsel to settle the suit
on the uninsured motorist coverage, Union, in bad faith, refused to settle such
litigation and never entered into serious negotiations, and engaged in only a
perfunctory investigation and developed no defense.1 7
The Braesches' amended petition also alleged that "Union's refusal
to settle was part of an effort to put psychological pressure on each of
13. Id at 1037.
14. See supra note 2 and cases cited therein.
15. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 46, 464 N.W.2d 769, 771 (1991).
16. Id. at 47, 464 N.W.2d at 771.
17. Id at 47, 464 N.W.2d at 772.
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the Braesches to settle the wrongful death claim for sums considera-
bly less than its value."'s
The Braesches' second theory of relief was intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Braesches alleged that Union should have
known that forcing the litigation would cause them mental pain and
suffering and that they were entitled to damages for having to relive
their daughter's death.19
The trial court sustained demurrers to both the bad faith and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and dismissed the
plaintiffs' lawsuits.
C. Holding
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the trial court and recog-
nized the cause of action for bad faith failure of an insurer to settle a
first party claim. However, the court upheld the trial court finding
that the Braesches failed to state an actionable claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 20
The Braesch court held that because of the "public interest in in-
surance contracts, the nature of insurance contracts, and the inequity
of the bargaining power between the insurer and the policyholder,"
extracontractual tort liability had to be extended to first party breach
of contract cases. 21 The court attempted to draw a brighi line limiting
the reach of the bad faith breach of contract tort to insurance con-
tracts by distinguishing insurance contracts from other commercial
contracts.22 The court thus expanded the rights of insurance consum-
ers while addressing the commercial interests' concerns regarding the
exposure of businesses to tort actions in non-insurance contractual
settings.
The Braesch court adopted the standard of care applied by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.,23 which
requires the plaintiff to show some form of intentional wrongdoing.
18. Id at 47, 464 N.W.2d at 772.
19. Id- at 47-48, 464 N.W.2d at 772.
20. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that "[t]o state a cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that (1) there has
been intentional or reckless conduct, (2) the conduct was so outrageous in charac-
ter and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and it
is to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,
and (3) the conduct caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person
should be expected to endure it." Id at 60, 464 N.W.2d at 778-79. The Braesch
court concluded that the insurer's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous and
that the Braesches' emotional distress was not severe enough to support this the-
ory of relief. I&i at 60, 464 N.W.2d at 779.
21. 1&L at 51, 464 N.W.2d at 774.
22. 1d
23. 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
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The plaintiff alleges sufficient facts of intentional wrongdoing if she
shows a "reckless disregard of the lack of reasonable basis for denying
the claim."24 The Braesch court found that the plaintiff could satisfy
this element of the Anderson test by showing Union's delaying tactics
and Union's failure to develop any reasonable defense to the
Braesches' claim.25
The court noted that damages for mental distress are normally not
allowed in breach of contract actions unless the breach amounted "in
substance to a willful or independent tort."26 Additionally, the court
stated that the Braesches had pled sufficient facts to state a cause of
action for bad faith settlement. Union's settlement tactics were so se-
vere that the court considered their conduct tortious. Since the
Braesches recovered for all the injuries sustained as a proximate re-
sult of Union's conduct, it was proper for them to claim as damages
their mental suffering caused by the bad faith tortious conduct.27
II. RATIONALE OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH IN
THE FIRST PARTY CONTEXT
In Braesch, the court implied the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a first party insurance claims.28 In the process, the court
rejected Union's contention that the adversarial nature of uninsured
motorist claims precluded the imposition the bad faith tort. Union's
argument was based on the premise that the fiduciary relationship in-
volved in settling third party claims is necessary to impose bad faith
liability.2 9
Union maintained that in third party claims the insurer's authority
to act on the insured's behalf was similar to an attorney-client rela-
tionship.30 Union attempted to distinguish uninsured motorist claims
from early third party decisions by noting that in the uninsured mo-
torist context, the insured is trying to recover from the uninsured mo-
torist and the insurer is assuming the position of the uninsured
motorist. Union contended that the "insured and insurer become ad-
versaries, not principal and agent who deal in trust."31 Therefore,
Union concluded that there was no bad faith tort in first party cases
because of the absence of a fiduciary relationship.3 2
24. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 58, 464 N.W.2d 769, 778 (1991).
25. I.
26. Id at 59, 464 N.W.2d at 778.
27. Id
28. Id at 51, 464 N.W.2d at 774.
29. Id at 50, 464 N.W.2d at 773.
30. Id
31. Id-
32. Id. See also Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 155 (Kan.
1980)(no fiduciary relationship between parties to uninsured motorist policy be-
cause company in effect defends liability of uninsured motorist).
[Vol. 72:608
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The Braesch court rejected this view, citing the Seventh Circuit
opinion in Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co.33 as the better view.3 4 In
Craft, a case that interpreted Indiana's common law policies allowing
first party bad faith tort claims, the Seventh Circuit noted that a liabil-
ity insurance company's control over litigation is only one aspect of
the insurance relationship that obligates insurers to good faith and fair
dealing.35
Braesch quoted Craft as follows:
Under third party liability coverage, when the insured is sued by a third party,
the insurance company takes over the defense of the suit and the insured can-
not settle the matter without the permission of the insurer. It is this control
of the litigation by the insurer coupled with differing levels of exposure to
economic loss which gives rise to the "fiduciary" nature of the insurer's duty
... In the uninsured motorist situation there is no element of "control" of the
insured's side of the litigation by the insurance company which would give rise
to a "fiduciary" duty. It does not necessarily follow that the insurer is com-
pletely free of any obligation of good faith and fair dealing to its insured, since
the latter duty is based on the reasonable expectations of the insured and the
unequal bargaining positions of the contractants, rather than the insurance
company's "control" of the litigation 3 6
The Craft court rejected the notion that the adversary relationship
in uninsured motorist claims was inconsistent with the duty of good
faith:
This does not make the insurance company an insurer in fact of the uninsured
motorist.... Moreover, it does not make the insurer a stranger to its insured.
After all, the insured is the one who pays the premiums for the uninsured
motorist protection and the "reasonable expectation" that he will be dealt
with fairly and in good faith by his insurer is still present.37
Rather than premising liability on a fiduciary relationship, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court attempted to justify application of tort liability
in insurance contracts, but not in other commercial settings.
The Braesch court identified three factors that distinguish the rela-
tionship between the insurer and the insured from other voluntary
commercial associations: 1) the public interest in insurance contracts
2) the non-commercial aspects of the insurance contract and 3) the
inequity of the bargaining power between the insurer and the
policyholder.38
The three factors identified by the Braesch court are closely inter-
related. Insurance is subject to the public interest because the nature
of the transaction is of vital importance to society. Additionally, as
one commentator has noted, insurance has always had special rules
33. 572 F.2d 565, 69 (7th Cir. 1978).
34. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 50-51, 464 N.W.2d 769, 773-74 (1991).
35. Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1978).
36. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 50-51, 464 N.W.2d 769, 773-74 (1991).
37. Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1978).
38. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 51, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1991).
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because of its "quasi-monopolistic nature" and its potential for "ex-
ploitation" and "oppression."3 9
The public nature of insurance is demonstrated by its high level of
regulation. The Nebraska Legislature expressly recognized the public
character of insurance by stating-
The business of apportioning and distributing losses arising from specified
causes among all those who apply and are accepted to receive the benefits of
such service, is public in character, and requires that all those having to do
with it shall at all times be actuated by good faith in everything pertaining
thereto.4 0
Additionally, society encourages setting aside earnings to insure
against an uncertain future because such insurance coverage for risk
reduces survivors' dependence on government aid.41
A. Special Nature of Insurance Contracts: Security and Peace of Mind
The second rationale. the Nebraska Supreme Court used to distin-
guish insurance contracts from other commercial contracts was the
non-commercial aspects of the insurance contract.42 The special na-
ture of the insurance contract is highlighted by the divergent goals of
the parties. The insurer enters the transaction bargaining for premi-
ums it hopes to avoid repaying. Moreover, the insurer bases its deci-
sion upon actuarial tables of risk.43 The insurance consumer,
however, is seeking more than the fulfillment of purely economic
39. See Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contracts?-Induc-
tions From a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First Party Insurance Con-
tracts, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 330, 352 (1980): "Today, the common carrier or public
utility rather than the smith or ferryman is affected with a public interest be-
cause of its monopoly or quasi-monopoly power."
40. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-101 (Reissue 1988): "In view of the statutory requirement
that all automobile liability policies include coverage for uninsured motorists, the
public interest is of the highest order in [the] case of [uninsured motorist cases]."
Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 52, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1991).
41. See, e.g., KEETON & WIniss supra note 5, § 8.6(c)(2) at 974 (governments en-
courage participation in insurance programs to reduce costs to aid programs that
are funded from general appropriations); MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSUR.
ANCE, § 45:682 at 321 (2d ed. rev. 1981)(effective implementation of mandatory
automobile insurance laws eases burden on state funds).
42. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 53, 464 N.W.2d 769, 775 (1991). See also
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 912 (1980)("[A]s a supplier of a public service... [insurers must] go beyond
meeting reasonable expectations of coverage. [Those] obligations.. .encompass
qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduci-
ary.... [Along] with the public's trust [goes] private responsibility .....
43. KEETON & WrDDIS, supra note 5, § 1.3(b)(2) at 12-13. The insurer calculates its
premium by estimating a number of factors, including (1) the proportion of the
total estimated cost a particular insured could claim from the "pool of risks" to
which that insured belongs, (2) an additional amount to compensate for underes-
timation of the total risk to which the insurer is exposed, and (3) a profit for the
insurer.
[Vol. 72:608
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goals such as protecting against financial loss. The typical insured also
seeks the security of knowing that if some unexpected tragedy occurs,
she will have mitigated her personal hardship, suffering and grief by
having the foresight to invest in an insurance policy.44 Thus, because
of the special non-economic goals of insurance consumers, courts have
been more willing to impose higher duties and extracontractual liabili-
ties upon insurers.
In addressing the special nature of the insurance contract, the
Braesch court cited the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Rawlings
v. Apodaca45 with approval, noting that the purchaser of insurance
seeks security and peace of mind rather than commercial advantage.
Although courts have been very reluctant to recognize actions in
tort for bad faith breach of contract outside the realm of insurance
contracts, an extension of this reasoning could lead to further crum-
bling of the walls between tort and contract. One could argue that
peace of mind and security are the motivation of many contracts.
One might apply this reasoning to employment contracts, residen-
tial leases and many other consumer contracts. Such reasoning could
crumble the walls between tort and contract, especially if it was ap-
plied to employment contracts, residential leases or other consumer
contracts. For instance, in Wallis v. Superior Court,46 a California ap-
pellate court held that the tort of bad faith breach of contract applied
to non-insurance contracts if the relationship had "similar characteris-
tics" to an insurance contract.47 The California Supreme Court, how-
ever, has not recognized tort liability for breach of the implied
covenant in the "usual employment relationship."48
44. Id. '"The policy holder purchasing insurance... pays ... a premium which is
calculated by estimating a number of factors .... In exchange for the premium,
the insured receives a measure of certainty... [in which even] in the absence of a
loss... the insured has still enjoyed the certainty that if the insured event had
occurred, insurance... would have been available...." Keeton, supra note 4, at
§ 1.3(b)(2) at 12.
45. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575 (Ariz. 1986).
46. 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984). The California Court of Appeals set forth the following
test to determine if tort liability may be imposed on the parties to a noninsurance
contract for bad faith:
1. The contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal
bargaining positions.
2. The motivation for entering the contract must be a nonprofit motiva-
tion, that is, to secure peace of mind, security or future protection.
3. Ordinary contract damages are not adequate because they do not re-
quire the party in the superior bargaining position to account for its ac-
tions, and so they do not make the inferior party "whole."
4. One party is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may
suffer and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform.
5. The other party is aware of this vulnerability.
Id at 129.
47. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 52, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991).
48. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the implied covenant of
good faith in an employment contract but did not hold that tort reme-
dies were available. 49 Rather, the court applied the covenant in its
traditional form as a gap-filling tool to interpret ambiguous contract
terms.5O
B. Unequal Bargaining Power
The third distinguishing factor cited by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Braesch was the unequal bargaining position between insur-
ance companies and insureds.51 This distinction does little to distin-
guish insurance contracts from other commercial contracts which
involve unequal bargaining power and standardized adhesion
contracts.
C. Public Interest and Incentive Structure
The Braesch court expended considerable effort explaining why in-
49. See Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 387 N.W.2d 692
(1986).
50. The employment agreement contained a clause that employees would not be
fired without just cause. Id. at 830, 387 N.W.2d at 694. See also STEPHEN S.
AsHLEY, BAD FAITH AcTONs: LIABILrTY AND DAMAGEs, § 1.02 at 1-2 (1990). "In
'interpreting' a contract by mean§ of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, judges performed a 'gap filling' function, supplementing the contract
with a common understanding that the parties either shared but did not express
or would, in all probability, have shared had they directed their attention to the
issue."
The traditional gap filling role for the implied covenant of good faith has been
stated as requiring "[i]n all insurance contracts, particularly where the language
[concerning] coverage may be deceptive.., an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing that the insurer will not do anything to injure [its insured]." Bowler
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 250 A.2d 580, 587-88 (N.J. 1969).
51. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 53, 464 N.W.2d 769, 775 (1991). Insurers
nearly always possess considerable financial resources which they must protect
by carefully limiting the terms of their coverage contracts. They employ lengthy
and standardized insurance contract forms that serve the insurers' goal of limit-
ing coverage at the expense of clarity to the customer. KEETON & WIDDIS, Supra
note 5, § 2.8(a) at 118-121.
On the other hand customers of insurance seldom have much choice among
insurance firms since these firms employ standardized contract forms. Id,
§ 2.8(b) at 121. Nor do average customers have any realistic chance of bargaining
for nonstandard additions or deletions to insurance contracts they wish to
purchase since that would upset the insurers' risk calculations. 1d, § 2.8(a) at 119.
The preceding factors exist in part because of the unequal bargaining power be-
tween the insurer and the insured. Holmes, supra note 37, at 345.
Of course unequal bargaining power and the use of adhesive contracts exist
anytime a consumer seeks a product or service that only large scale enterprises
can provide. Cf., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943). Most contracts
today involve only minimal bargaining over the most elementary terms. Holmes,
supra note 37, at 344.
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surance contracts are different from other commercial contacts.5 2
However, the court never addressed the heart of the policy rationale
for imposing the duty of good faith and fair dealing upon insurers.
The crux of the matter is that insurers are torn by a conflict of inter-
est in settling claims at the same time that consumers place a great
deal of trust in insurance companies for their well-being and security.
Courts have dealt with this conflict of interest by implementing a
strong incentive structure to compel insurers to deal in good faith with
the insured.
Focusing on the unique conflict of interest involved in the settle-
ment of insurance claims is the most rational basis for distinguishing
insurance contracts from other commercial contracts. Most commer-
cial contracts contain built-in mechanisms which provide disincentives
to breaching the agreement since the consumer does not complete
payment before any obligation arises to the other party. For instance,
a rental agreement has a built-in disincentive to prevent a landlord
from breaching his duty to provide habitable dwelling units, in that
the tenant may refuse to pay rent.5 3 Similarly, employment contracts
have a built-in incentive for employers to pay their employees because
unpaid employees will quit work and seek other employment.
However, the insurance contract is unique in that the consumer
has completely performed all obligations under the contract by paying
premiums. Thus, the insurer stands in a position of considerable eco-
nomic power and discretion by virtue of the trust the insured placed in
him to perform his side of the bargain in the event of a substantial
loss. The potential for the insurer to save money on the policy by de-
laying and pressuring the insured to settle for less or litigating and
defeating liability creates a severe conflict of interest. Moreover,
under traditional contract principles, the insurer has nothing to lose
but the policy amount plus interest. The rewards of avoiding substan-
tial liability through bad faith conduct dwarf the insignificant damages
an insurer risks under traditional contract rules. The conflict of inter-
est which permeates the settlement of insurance claims is common
throughout both third party and first party bad faith actions. This
unique conflict provides a more rational way of explaining why deci-
sions like Braesch have imposed an incentive structure involving tort
remedies upon insurance contracts, but not upon other commercial
contracts which have built-in disincentives against breach of the
agreement.
The Braesch court came closest to identifying the "conflict of inter-
est" policy rationale when it cited the public character of insurance
52. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 52-53, 464 N.W.2d 769, 775 (1991).
53. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 74-1425 (1990)(tenant may terminate rental agreement for
landlords' material breach of duty to provide habitable premises).
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contracts.5 4 The Nebraska Supreme Court seemed to be saying that
the insurance business resembles a publicly regulated utility, an enter-
prise so vital to the public interest that the court must impose on its
practitioners a strong incentive structure to conform their conduct to
benefit the public interest.55
However, the court's public interest analysis is incomplete. The
court should have gone a step farther and recognized that the ration-
ale underlying public regulation of insurance is the conflict of interest
inherent in settling insurance claims. This conflict is more severe
than in other commercial contracts due to the lack of any built-in dis-
incentives that might prevent insurers from breaching the duty to set-
tle in good faith.
The Braesch court relied in part on Rawlings v. Apodaca to deter-
mine that insurers should be held liable for tortious breaches of the
implied covenant of good faith where the contract creates a special,
partly non-commercial relationship in which the insured "seeks some-
thing more than commercial advantage or profit from the [insurer]."556
The Nebraska Supreme Court stopped short of recognizing the
more compelling rationale in Rawlings. The Rawlings court recog-
nized that the incentive structure underlying the tort of bad faith ex-
ists primarily because of the unique conflict of interest which attends
the insurer's decision to pay insurance claims:
If the only damages an insurer will have to pay upon a judgement of breach
are the amounts that it would have owed under the policy plus interest, it has
every interest in retaining the money... Thus, we conclude that one of the
prime reasons for the recognition of tort actions for breach of the implied obli-
gations raised by certain contractual relationships is that any other rule pro-
vides more of an incentive for breach of the contract than its performance.5 7
III. DAMAGES: FROM HADLEY V. BAXENDALE TO TORT
OF BAD FAITH
In Braesch, the court allowed damages for mental anguish, though
the court recognized that "Damages for mental anguish are not as a
general rule, recoverable in actions for breach of contract unless the
breach amounts in substance to a willful or independent tort."58
54. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 51-52, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1991).
55. Id,
56. Id at 52-53, 464 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 575
(Ariz. 1986).
57. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565 at 575-76 (Ariz. 1986).
58. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 59, 464 N.W.2d 769, 778 (1991). The Ne-
braska Supreme Court allowed mental anguish damages in Braesch in spite of the
lack of physical injury. But see Bailey v. Farmers Union Coop. Ins. Co., No. A-91-
1158, 1992 Neb. App. LEXIS 227 (Dec. 22,1992). In Bailey, the Nebraska Court of
Appeals held that although a physical injury was not required for "mental
anguish damages" there must be injuries for which the insured is not compen-
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The notion that damages recoverable in breach of contract actions
do not include mental anguish damages is based on the Hadley v. Bax-
endale59 rule that limits contractual damages to those sums which
compensate the party for losses "such as may reasonably be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they made
the contract and were the probable result of the breach of it."60
Many courts construing Hadley have refused to allow mental
anguish damages because they are considered "outside the contempla-
tion of the parties as a matter of law."61 Thus, because most courts
assume that traditional contract rules would not provide for such con-
sequential damages in breach of contract claims, decisions like Braesch
have characterized an insurer's breach of contract as sounding in tort
so that consequential damages would be available for the plaintiff
seeking compensation for insurers' breach of the implied covenant of
good faith.62
IV. CLASSIFYING CAUSE OF ACTION AS
TORT OR CONTRACT
As long as courts continue to allow different damages in tort claims
as opposed to contract claims, litigants must determine whether to
characterize a cause of action as a tort or a contract. The characteriza-
tion of bad faith as a tort action has been criticized as a sterile labeling
process. 63 Classifying an insurer's breach of contract as a tort has stra-
sated by the damages awarded for breach of contract, and those damages must
cause severe emotional distress or mental suffering. Id at *38. In Bailey, the
court noted that the insured had been forced to beg her estranged sister for lodg-
ing and get a job against her doctors orders. The court held this type of injury
could not be compensated by a damage award based on the policy. The appellate
court noted that two factors to be considered in determining whether mental suf-
fering is severe are "The intensity and the duration of the distress." Id at *42
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 cmt. D (1965)).
59. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
60. Id. at 147.
61. Holmes, supra note 39, at 338.
62. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 59, 464 N.W.2d 769, 778 (1991).
63. Holmes, supra note 39. Professor Holmes reasons that the foundation of bad
faith liability lies in equity and that judicial policing of overreaching by insurers
is analogous to the use of the good faith principle to imply warranties of
merchantability (see U.C.C. § 2-314) and warranties of habitability. Holmes fur-
ther reasons that "In the absence of any reliable criteria for making a choice be-
tween tort and contract, courts often make a result oriented distinction." Holmes
supra, note 37, at 370-71. The tort characterization will depend upon the nature
of the insurer's conduct. Id at 371. Moreover, a study of several Georgia deci-
sions concludes the type of conduct an insurer engages in is the most significant
factor in determining whether an action will be classified as a tort. The study
noted that in contract actions in which mental suffering damages were denied,
there was not "sufficiently aggravated conduct" and that where the conduct justi-
fies mental suffering the court will be able to find a "tort." Larry Ribstein, Tort
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tegic significance with the foremost consideration being the availabil-
ity of consequential damages.64 Additionally, many procedural issues
arise from the otherwise artificial or "elastic" distinction between tort
and contract.65 Depending on the styling of the cause of action, liti-
gators involved in bad faith litigation must be aware of different stat-
utes of limitation,66 the assignability of the cause of action, 67 whether
the parole rule of evidence applies6s and whether particular affirma-
tive defenses are appropriate.6 9
V. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY
A. Standard of Care
In Braesch, the insurer denied coverage in spite of clear liability
and Contract in Georgia, 30 MERCER L. REv. 303, 309 (1978). This analysis fairly
characterizes Nebraska's bad faith decisions. To date, Nebraska decisions have
held that an insurer's conduct must amount "in substance to a willful and in-
dependent tort" for the bad faith cause of action to apply. Braesch v. Union Ins.
Co., 237 Neb. 44, 59, 464 N.W.2d at 778 (1991).
64. Where the insured's cause of action sounds in bad faith breach of extra contrac-
tual damages, the general rule for tort recovery applies to allow the injured party
to recover "all detriment caused whether it could have been anticipated or not."
SHERNoFF, ET AL., supra note 1, § 7.04[1] at 7-15 (quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1041 (Cal. 1973)).
65. Cf., Note, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract as Applied by the Courts of
New York, 14 BROOK L. REv. 196 (1948).
66. An action upon a contract or promise in writing must be brought within five
years. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-205(1)(Reissue 1989). An action for an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not enumerated elsewhere in
the Nebraska Civil Procedure Code, must be brought within four years. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-207(3)(Reissue 1989).
67. Courts in virtually all jurisdictions have held that an insured may assign his cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith. SHERNOFF ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 2.04[2][a][i](citations omitted).
68. The parole evidence rule when applied to insurance contracts provides that the
document is the complete agreement between the parties. KEETON & WIDDIS,
supra note 5, § 6.1(c)(2) at 622. If the bad faith cause of action exists indepen-
dently of the contract and attaches over and above the terms of the contract, cf,
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1040 (Cal. 1973), the parole evidence
rule would presumably not apply as an insured's defense that the written con-
tract excluded bad faith damages. On the other hand the Gruenberg court states
that the parties still may by the terms of the contract define their respective obli-
gations and duties. Id.
69. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1040 (Cal. 1973). ("[The] duty of good
faith and fair dealing on the part of... insurance companies is... absolute ... the
nonperformance by one party of its contractual duties cannot excuse a breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the other .... ). Where the plaintiff
pleads an intentional tort cause of action, his contributory negligence is irrelevant
under the general rule. See Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co., 213
Neb. 873, 332 N.W.2d 196 (1983). Nebraska's recently enacted comparative fault
law applies only to negligence actions. See generally, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 185
(1992 Cum. Supp.).
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under the policy. The Braesch court focused on Union's delaying tac-
tics and Union's failure to develop any reasonable defense to the
Braesches' claim to determine that Union's breach was a willful tort.7 0
Other Nebraska cases dealing with third party insurance claims pro-
vide further insight into the types of conduct that will expose an in-
surer to extracontractual damages.71
B. The Duty to Investigate
Nebraska case law has established that a lack of due care in investi-
gating and reviewing claims will expose an insurer to excess liability.72
In Hadenfeldt v. State Farm Mut Auto Insurance Co.,73 an early third
party case, the Nebraska Supreme Court held "an insurer is obligated
to use due care and reasonable diligence to ascertain the facts sur-
rounding a claim and obtain competent legal advice concerning the
claims." However, one should not be misled by the reasonable dii-
70. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 58, 464 N.W.2d 769, 778 (1991) See also
Bailey v. Farmers Union Coop. Ins. Co., No. A-91-1158,1992 Neb. App. LEXIS 327
(Dec. 22, 1992). In Bailey, the Nebraska Appellate Court held the insurer liable
for bad faith. Farmer's Union had tried to pressure the insured to settle for ac-
tual cash value as payment for her destroyed home when the policy clearly pro-
vided for replacement value. Additionally, Farmer's Union told the insured that
her claim was "questionable" six weeks after an internal report stated that "the
loss was covered." I& at *10-.. Farmer's Union refused to pay the replacement
value after two years and repeated demands. The trial court in Bailey "castigated
Farmers Union for the almost criminal effort to force Bailey to accept actual cash
value as almost total satisfaction on the claim even though she was entitled to
replacement costs." HeL at *25. The types of conduct the trial court focused on in
Bailey were the insurers delaying tactics, misinterpretation of policy provisions to
avoid coverage, and denial of the claim in spite of an internal finding that the loss
was covered by the policy. Id. at *17. Conduct that has subjected insurers to bad
faith liability in other jurisdictions include: inadequate investigation, delay, com-
pelling insureds to seek legal redress (in spite of no reasonable grounds for de-
nial), deception, misinterpretation to avoid coverage, threats, false accusations,
oppressive demands, conditioning payment of undisputed portion of the claim on
settlement of disputed portion, nondisclosure of insured's rights under the policy,
and retaliatory cancellations. Ashley, supra note 48, §§ 5.04 - 5.22.
71. See, eg., Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, 118 N.W.2d 318 (1962)(insurer
was held not liable for bad faith where it used all available means to assemble the
facts and determine applicable law); Hadenfeldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 195 Neb. 578, 239 N.W.2d 499 (1976)(where insurer used reasonable diligence
in investigating the facts and the law, mistaken judgement was not grounds for
bad faith).
72. Subsequent to the Braesch decision the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a suf-
ficient cause of action for bad faith had been stated when the plaintiff alleged that
the insurer had denied fire insurance coverage based on suspected arson without
conducting a proper investigation and subjecting the results to a reasonable eval-
uation and review. Ruwe v. Farmers Mut. United Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 67, 469
N.W.2d 129 (1991).




gence language used by the court. The court's standard of care is not
based on negligence.
C. Unreasonable v. Reckless Conduct
Nebraska case law on bad faith litigation reflects the view that for
an insurer to be held liable for extracontractual damages, some form
of subjective dishonesty, fraud or concealment must be involved.7 4 In
Braesch, the court cited with approval the language of Olson v. Union
Fire Insurance Co.,75 that "neither mistaken judgement nor unreason-
able judgement is the equivalent of bad faith." 76
Nebraska has adopted a more subjective standard of care based on
the competing policy objective of allowing insurance companies to in-
vestigate questionable or fraudulent claims with flexibility. The
Braesch standard combines an objective element, the lack of any rea-
sonable basis for denial of a claim, with a subjective element, the in-
surer's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of merit to its
claim denial. This combination objectivesubjective test comes from
the Wisconsin case Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.7 7 In Anderson,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, "To show a claim for bad
faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for deny-
ing benefits of the (insurance) policy and the defendant's knowledge
or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the
claim."78 Thus, the Anderson court concluded "that the tort of bad
faith is an intentional one. 'Bad faith' by definition cannot be uninten-
tional." 79 Under the Anderson test as adopted in Braesch, subjective
bad faith may be inferred by "a reckless disregard of a lack of a rea-
sonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to facts or to proofs
submitted by the insured."8 0 California and some other jurisdictions
have adopted lower standards of care based solely upon the objective
74. See Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, 382, 118 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1962).
75. 175 Neb. 375, 118 N.W.2d 318 (1962).
76. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 56, 464 N.W.2d 469, 777 (1991); Olson v.
Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, 382, 118 N.W.2d 318,322 (1962)(quoting Davy v.
Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960)).
77. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
78. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 691, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978),
cited with approval in Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 57, 464 N.W.2d 769,
777 (1991).
79. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W,2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
80. I- at 377. The Nebraska Supreme Court elaborated on the standard of care
adopted in Braesch in a subsequent decision. Ruwe v. Farmers Mut. United Ins.
Co., 238 Neb. 67, 469 N.W.2d 129 (1991). The court held that "Reckless indiffer-
ence to the facts or to the proof submitted by an insured is shown by an insurer's
failure to conduct a proper investigation and subject the results to a reasonable
evaluation and review" and that "Ruwe's claim that Farmers denied his claim
without a proper and thorough investigation of the fire scene sufficiently alleged
that element of the Braesch test." Id. at 74, 469 N.W.2d at 135.
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standard of whether the insurer acted "unreasonably."81
The high standard of proof required under the Anderson test bal-
ances the twin policy objectives of 1) allowing insurers flexibility in
investigating questionable claims and 2) providing insurers with an in-
centive to pay claims in which liability is clear. At the same time, the
Anderson test does not subject insurance companies to liability based
solely on "objective" standards of conduct.82
VI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A plaintiff who pleads a bad faith first party action in Nebraska is
pleading a hybrid intentional tort.83 The plaintiff's contributory or
comparative negligence should not reduce the defendant's potential li-
ability.84 Further, since Nebraska has adopted the standard tort ver-
sion for bad faith actions, the insured's performance of the contract
terms should be irrelevant to his recovery.8 5
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The Nebraska Supreme Court's rationale amounts to the imposi-
tion of a quasi-fiduciary duty upon insurers to deal fairly and in good
faith with their insured. The Braesch court identified the partially
non-commercial nature of insurance contracts and the vital public im-
portance of insurance as the rationale for employing the good faith
duty.
The Nebraska Supreme Court used these two factors, as well as the
inequitable bargaining positions between insurers and insured, to dis-
tinguish insurance contracts from other commercial contracts. None-
theless, the bright line the Nebraska Supreme Court tried to draw
between insurance contracts and other commercial contracts may not
be all that defensible. One can think of numerous other consumer
81. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032,1037 (Cal. 1973)(unreasonable con-
duct subjects insurance defendant to bad faith liability).
82. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1985).
83. "It is clear that something more than negligence is required in third party cases
[to establish tort liability]; there must be some level of intentional wrongdoing ...
'Bad faith' by definition cannot be unintentional." Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237
Neb. 44, 56, 464 N.W.2d 769, 777 (1991). But see Nebraska Uniform Commercial
Code, NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-104(1)(b)(Reissue 1980): ("Good faith" in the case of a
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade); NEB. REv. STAT. § 1-201, cmt. 19: "In cer-
tain articles, by specific provision, additional requirements [apply] .... In the case
of a merchant observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing [are
required]." The objective good faith standard for merchants in sales contracts
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies only to sales of goods.
Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code, NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-102 (reissue 1980).
84. See supm note 69 and accompanying text.
85. I&
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adhesion contracts which are difficult to distinguish from insurance
contracts using the factors cited by Braesch.
It seems the real policy rationale of the Court in Braesch is that it
considers this service so infused with the public interest that it wants
to provide insurers with a strong incentive to deal fairly and in good
faith with insureds. The Nebraska Supreme Court should have gone a
step further and explained that the inherent conflict of interest in-
volved in paying insurance claims makes it necessary to provide an
effective incentive structure for insurers to deal in good faith.
One may wonder how far the imposition of extracontractual tort
remedies will invade other contractual settings. To date, courts have
been extremely reluctant to extend the tort remedies of bad faith
outside the realm of insurance contracts.
Steven B. Fillman '93
